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Takings and the Public Interest
in Railroad Reorganization
The decade of the 1960's brought an era of economic crisis to Amer-
ica's great eastern railroads. The crisis has precipitated a new breed
of railroad reorganizations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act,'
characterized by the carriers' basic inability to produce revenues large
enough to cover even operating expenses. 2 This economic fact has pro-
duced an acute conflict between the public's interest in continued rail
service and the security interest of the railroads' creditors, for the con-
tinuation of services during reorganization proceedings perpetuates
losses that must be financed by consuming railroad assets and devadu-
1. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). Detailed studies of Section 77 reorganizations, their history,
and their procedures can be found in H. GTrrHMANN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINAN-
CIAL POLICY 646-87 (3d ed. 1955); Swaine, A Decade of Reorganization under Section 77
of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1943); Will, Railroad Reorgani.
zation, 41 ILL. L. REV. 608 (1947).
2. For one excellent description of the overall ills of eastern railroads, see Shabecoff,
Collapse of Penn Central Reflects Ills of Railroads, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1973, § 1, at 1, col.
6. For a brief but helpful introduction to the interminable reorganization of the New
Haven Railroad and to the ongoing reorganizations of the Penn-Central and the Boston
& Maine, see Haskell, Railroad Reorganization for Beginners, 24 ALA. L. REV. 295 (1972).
In addition to the Penn-Central and the Boston & Maine, the following northeastern rail-
roads are presently in Section 77 reorganization: the Central of New Jersey, the Reading,
the Erie-Lackawanna, the Lehigh Valley, the Lehigh & Hudson River, and the New Hope
& Ivyland. See Shabecoff, supra.
In response to continuing rail losses exceeding $20 million per month, Judge Fullam,
the Penn-Central's reorganization judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, issued
tough instructions to the road's reorganization trustees on March 6, 1973. He demanded
that they submit by July 2 either a practicable reorganization plan or a proposal for
liquidating the Penn-Central. See Bedingfield, A Deadline Given to Penn Central, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 7, 1973, at 1, col. 7 (city ed.); Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1973, at 3, col. 2. Judge
FuIlam's action in effect established a deadline for determining whether or not there was
any reasonable likelihood of a viable reorganization of the Penn-Central and, therefore,
any legal justification for continuing in Section 77.
The future of the Penn-Central and of the other bankrupt railroads is currently the
subject of vigorous debate. The Department of Transportation is presently preparilg a
plan for restructuring the entire northeastern rail industry. This plan is expected to em-
phasize, as did Judge Fullam, the rights of creditors and to declare that forced deficit
operations on bankrupt lines are not in the public interest as heretofore presumed. See
Karr, Nixon's Plan to Realign Rail Freight Lines in Northeast Likely to Rule Out Federal
Aid, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1973, at 4, col. 2; Robbins, U.S. Weighs Plan to Speed Close
of Losing Rail Lines, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1973, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.). A Senate Com-
merce Committee report issued on February 10 also offers wide-ranging proposals for
salvaging the railroads. See Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1973, at 2, col. 3; Shabecoff, supra. On
March 24 the I.C.C. submitted a report to Congress outlining its views on the problem.
See Robbins, I.C.C. Seeks Rail Aid Plan with 1% Levy on Freight, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25,
1973, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
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ing creditors' interest in those assets. In the New Haven Inclusion
Cases3 the Supreme Court faced this conflict for the first time and held
that the creditors' interest was subordinate to that of the public. Not
only were the trains properly kept running, the Court held, but also
the burden of inevitable losses arising from their operation was prop-
erly left on the railroad's creditors.
As the New Haven case will show, the railroad crisis has produced
in turn a potential crisis in constitutional doctrine that may eventually
dwarf it in significance. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No per-
son shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."'4 In the past, courts have applied the latter clause,
the Takings Clause, as a guarantee of owners' right to retrieve their
property from unprofitable uses and to re-deploy it elsewhere. This
right was apparently denied to railroad creditors in the New Haven
case in deference to a supervening public right in rail properties. If the
Takings Clause is to have any viability, it must be recognized that the
"public rights" theory of New. Haven was conceptually unsound, for
the "right of retrieval" that it overrode is, in fact, the core of the
Takings Clause. Courts faced with similiar situations now and in the
future must devise a theory on which to distinguish the New Haven
case and acknowledge the right of retrieval as a measure of creditors'
constitutional due.
I
The first major railroad reorganization of recent years began on July
7, 1961, when the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad (the
New Haven) filed a petition under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.5
When the New Haven entered reorganization, it was losing about $1.5
million per month.0 Despite the efforts of the reorganization trustees
to economize, it was apparent by early 1963 that the line would never
again be profitable. 7 Rather than permit liquidation of the railroad,
3. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
4. U.S. Co.vsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies only to actions by the Fed-
eral Government. State governments are restrained instead by the Fourteenth Amendment,
which contains a Due Process Clause but no Takings Clause. The relationship between
the two Amendments, as they bear upon this Note, is considered at p. 1010 ifra.
5. See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Order No. 1 (July 7, 1961). in I TiE NEW
YoRK, N.H. & H.R.R. REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS IN TIlE UNrrED STATES Dnrmicr CounT
FOR CONNEcuTcT 5 [hereinafter cited as NEW HAVEN PROCEEDNGS]. A general description
of the New Haven bankruptcy and of the early days of the reorganizatton can be lound
in Note, The New Haven Railroad Reorganization Proceedings, or the Little Railroad
That Couldn't, 78 HARv. L. REv. 861 (1965).
6. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 456 (D. Conn. 1968).
7. Id.
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the ICC, which had responsibility for formulating and certifying a plan
of reorganization,8 chose to attempt a sale of the New Haven to a large
trunk-line rail carrier.9 Neither the ICC10 nor the New Haven's re-
organization court (the district court)" believed that it would be com-
patible with the public interest to allow a discontinuation of rail serv-
ices and a liquidation of the New Haven. Eventually, the ICC ex-
tracted an agreement from the Pennsylvania and the New York Cen-
tral Railroads-then seeking the Commission's permission to merge-
to take over the New Haven line as a condition of the merger.' 2
The plan ultimately devised by the ICC13 and approved by the dis-
trict court' 4 required the Penn-Central to pay the December 31,
1966, "liquidation value" of New Haven assets., The valuation date
8. 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970).
9. In 1969 the district court recalled that:
By late 1963, it was clear to the Trustees of the New Haven and to [this] Court that
only two courses were open: the Trustees must press to accomplish the inclusion in a
Penn-Central merger or they must press for liquidation [of the New Haven]. Tile
former was obviously in the public interest and the latter was not. The course of
inclusion was followed ....
In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 800 (D. Conn. 1969).
Prior to 1963 the reorganization trustees had sought governmental assistance in the
form of subsidies and tax relief, which at the time seemed to offer a way of keeping the
New Haven alive and independent, See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Six Months In-
terim Report of the Trustees (Mar. 5, 1962), in 2 NEw HAVEN PROCEEINGS 700-(1), 700-
(126-31). The hoped-for public assistance never materialized. See In re New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., Memorandum of Decision re Petition for Order No. 287 (Feb. 15, 1965), in 5 NEw
HAVEN PROCEEDINGS 3109, 3116-22.
10. See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Trustees, Discontinuance of All Interstate
Passenger Trains, 327 I.C.C. 151, 201-18, 224-25 (1966); Passenger Fares, New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 314 I.C.C. 377, 378-79 (1961). From time to time, however, the ICC did author-
ize the abandonment of particularly unprofitable portions of the New Haven's pre-
bankruptcy rail service, viewing these as undue burdens on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Trustees, Discontinuance of Passenger Service between Boston
and Needham Heights, West Medway, Blackstone and Dedham, Mass., 327 I.C.C. 77 (1965).
11. See, e.g., In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 281 F. Supp. 65, 68-69 (D. Conn. 1968);
In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Memorandum of Decision on Petition for Order No. 25
(Oct. 20, 1961), in 1 NEw HAVEN PROCEEDINGS 290.
12. Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 475, 522-27 (1966).
The history and the terms of the Penn-Central merger are discussed in Penn-Central
Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968). This strategy for salvaging the New Haven line had
been foreseen quite early in the reorganization, as an alternative to actual reorganization,
if the federal and state governments did not provide adequate tax relief and subsidies.
See, e.g., In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Six Months Interim Report of the Trustees(Mar. 5, 1962), in 2 NEW HAVEN PROCEEDINGS 700-(1), 700-(30-31). The ICC had the
power under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act to require that merging railroads,
as a condition precedent to approval of the merger, take over and operate smaller rail
lines that might be adversely affected by the proposed merger. See 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1970).
In its principal decision on the New Haven inclusion, the district court observed that:
In consummating the merger Penn-Central agreed to pay whatever price and submit
to whatever terms for the inclusion that the [ICC] and the Courts might find
reasonable.
In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 460 (D. Conn. 1968). The Pennsylvania
and the New York Central Railroads agreed to the inclusion and to these terms in an-
ticipation of saving approximately $80 million per year through their merger. See New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 400 (1970).
13. See Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 331 I.C.C. 643 (1967).
14. See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451 (D. Conn. 1968).
15. Id. at 454.
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supposedly accounted for the delay that would have accompanied
actual abandonment of the railroad. 10 The price thus generated, how-
ever, was less than that which would have arisen from the actual aban-
donment and liquidation of the New Haven. The discrepancy was
rooted in the fact that the New Haven was required to continue its
rail services during lengthy purchase price negotiations,17 absorbing
operating losses at an annual rate of $10 to $20 million' s out of assets
with a total initial worth of approximately $200 to $250 million. 8
Assuming, as did the plan, that the liquidation process would have
commenced on the date of the reorganization petition, at least some of
the New Haven's operating losses from July 1961 to 1967 (the period
of hypothetical liquidation) would have been avoided. And, in actual
liquidation, certainly the post-1966 operating deficits, fixed charges,
and administrative expenses that were allocated in part to the New
Haven2 would not have existed.
Ultimately, those who bore the brunt of those losses were the New
Haven's mortgage bondholders. 2 1 The railroad's losses were financed
primarily through the issuance of trustees' certificates, new debt in-
struments taking a higher claim on the road's assets than any pre-
bankruptcy securities. Additional sources of loss were deferred property
taxes that continued to accumulate, also receiving priority over pre-
bankruptcy debts, and the physical deterioration of railroad assets that
resulted from postponement of maintenance.2 2
From 1961 until 1968 the district court repeatedly cautioned that
the Constitution might not tolerate perpetual forced deficit opera-
16. Looking back on the case in 1969, the district court clarified this point: "[Trhe
term 'fair liquidation value' has been used in the present case to describe a method
or theory of determining value. It envisioned sale of New Haven property over a period
of six years and of economic factors related to the business process of turning the proper-
ties into cash." In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 805 (D. Conn. 1969).
17. At the outset of the proceedings, the reorganization court directed that the New
Haven continue operating. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Order No. 1 (July 7, 1901),
in 1 NEw HAVEN PROCEE.iNcS 5. Moreover, under Sections 1(18) and 1(20) of the In-
terstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18), 1(20) (1970), the railroad would hase had to
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the ICC prior to discon-
tinuing services and abandoning the line. See Zim v. Hanover Bank, 215 F.2d 63, 69
(2d Cir. 1954).
18. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 458 (D. Conn. 1968).
19. The New Haven's asset worth in 1961 was presumably at least the sum of $162.7
million, the 1966 year-end valuation, see In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 304 F. Supp.
793, 797 (D. Conn. 1969), and $88 million, the railroad's deficits for the )ears 19t1
through 1966, see In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 458 (D. Conn. 1968).
20. In re New York, N.H. 8= H. R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 455, 457-59 (D. Conn. 1908).
21. The bondholders' losses were acknowledged by the district court throughout the
proceedings. See, e.g., In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 459-60 (D. Conn.
1968); In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., Memorandum of Decision re Petition for Order
No. 287 (Feb. 15, 1965), in 5 NEw HAVEN PROCEEDINGs 3109, 3111.
22. See Note, supra note 5, at 865-67.
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tion.23 At the same time that the court approved the ICC plan for a
Penn-Central purchase of the New Haven, it ruled that "the continued
erosion of the Debtor's estate from operational losses after the end of
1968 [would] clearly constitute a taking of the Debtor's property and
consequently the interests of the bondholders, without just compen-
sation." 24
The Supreme Court, in the 1970 New Haven Inclusion Cases,20 also
approved the basic plan.2 6 The Court added explicitly that the forced
deficit operation of the railroad constituted no taking of the bondhold-
ers' property prior to 1969, when the Penn-Central in fact took over
New Haven operations.27 Although acknowledging that the reorgani-
zation proceedings had "imposed a substantial loss upon the bond-
holders," the Court could "see no constitutional bar to that result."28
Contrary to the Court, a sound interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment cannot countenance the forced continuation of deficit rail opera-
tions without just compensation to rail creditors for their resulting
losses.
II
The New Haven courts failed to consider two seminal cases that had
defined a constitutional limit to railroad regulation.20 In Brooks-Scan-
23. The district court often fretted over the bondholders' losses. See, e.g., In re New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., Memorandum of Decision re Petition for Order No. 287 (Feb. 15,
1965), in 5 NEW HAVEN PROCEEDINGs 3109, 3115-23; In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
Memorandum of Decision on Petition for Order No. 81 (Mar. 5, 1962), in 1 NEw
HAVEN PROCEEDINGs 673, 675-77.
24. In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 459 (D. Conn. 1968).
25. 399 U.S. 392 (1970). The Inclusion Cases were a consolidation of actions in which
New Haven Railroad bondholders and bond indenture trustees challenged the validity
of terms under which the New Haven was to be included in the new Penn-Central
line. Some of these actions were on direct appeal from a decision of a three-judge court
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which had
reviewed the inclusion plan under Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act. See New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., Bondholders' Comm. v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Jurisdiction under the Interstate Commerce Act arose because inclusion of the
New Haven had been an express condition of the Penn-Central merger. See generally
Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968). The remaining actions were before the
Court on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
advance of judgment. Appeal to the Second Circuit had been taken from a judgment
of the New Haven's reorganization court-the District Court for Connecticut-which had
reviewed the inclusion plan as a plan of reorganization under Section 77 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. See In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451 (D. Conn. 1968).
26. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 489-95 (1970).
27. The precise issue in the Inclusion Cases was whether or not the terms of sale
to the Penn-Central were "fair and equitable" under Section 77(e) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 205(e) (1970), and "just and reasonable" tinder Section 5(2) of the In-
terstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1970). The Supreme Court seemed to assume,
however, that its task was to determine whether the price to be paid by the Penn.Ccntral
met the bondholders' constitutional entitlement. And its decision thus turned on the
basic question of the bondholders' rights under the Fifth Amendment.
28. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 491 (1970).
29. The district court first acknowledged Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Colnin'n, 251
U.S. 396 (1920), in 1969, when its inclusion decision of 1968 was already pending before
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Ion Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,30 the Supreme Court unanimously invali-
dated an order of a state railroad commission that required an intra-
state railroad to operate on specificed schedules at a loss. So long as the
railroad completely repudiated its state charter and its business as a
common carrier, the Court held, the owners had a right to abandon and
to liquidate: "If the [railroad] be taken to have granted to the public
an interest in the use of the railroad it may withdraw its grant by dis-
continuing the use when that use can be kept up only at a loss."3
Four years later the Supreme Court reaffirmed Brooks-Scanlon in
Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Texas R.R. 32 Once again a state regu-
latory commission had tried to prevent the shut-down and liquidation
of an unprofitable rail line. The Court reminded the commission that
the railroad,
although devoting its property to the use of the public, does not
do so irrevocably or absolutely.... And if at any time it develops
with reasonable certainty that future operation must be at a loss,
the company may discontinue operating and get what it can out
of the property by dismantling the road. To compel it to go on
at a loss or to give up the salvage value would be to take its prop-
erty without ... just compensation . . ..3
These decisions have never been challenged. In fact, Brooks-Scanlon
has been repeatedly acknowledged as a basic statement of rights under
the constitutional law of takings.34
Brooks-Scanlon articulated the principle that railroads may be com-
pelled to operate at a loss only if compensated for that loss. There ap-
the Supreme Court. See In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 802-05 (D.
Conn. 1969). In this case, the court dealt with an attempt by the ICC to reduce the
New Haven bondholders' "liquidation" entitlement even further than in the earlier in-
clusion plan: the Commission proposed to deduct from the New Haven purchase price
the costs of protracted, hypothetical abandonment proceedings under Section 1(18) of
the Interstate Commerce Act, concluding that Brooks-Scanlon had been overruled sub
silentio in Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926). See Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-
New York Cent. R.R., 334 I.C.C. 25, 53-57 (1968). The district court, however, rejected
the ICC's proposal, holding that Brooks-Scanlon was "applicable and determinative" of
the purchase price to be paid for the New Haven's assets, see 304 F. Supp. at 804, and.
moreover, that this outcome was unimpaired by subsequent regulatory legislation. Id.
at 801-02, quoting New York, N.H. & H. R.R., Bondholders' Comm. v. United States,
289 F. Supp. 418, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
31. Id. at 399.
32. 264 U.S. 79 (1924).
33. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n. 254 U.S. 513, 521 (1921);
City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); In re New
York, N.H. & H. R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 802-05 (D. Conn. 1969); Brooklyn Eastern
District Terminal v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Jay Street
Connecting R.R. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 609, 615 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
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pears to be no reason why this principle should not have been applied
in the New Haven case. The differences between New Haven and the
earlier cases do not provide a basis for distinguishing their constitu-
tional issues. First, there is no doctrinal significance to the fact that
the state orders invalidated in Brooks-Scanlon and Eastern Texas
were subject to the Fourteenth AmendmentG while the federal powers
exercised in New Haven were governed by the Fifth Amendment. 0
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings law has been developed as a
single theory, with courts often cross-citing freely between cases rest-
ing on the respective provisions.37 Moreover, it is the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Fifth, that lacks an explicit Takings Clause. Since
constitutional strictures against state and local takings are thus purely
inferential from due process of law,38 any arguable difference in the
meanings of the two amendments would favor a stronger Fifth Amend-
ment doctrine. Nor is it significant that the Brooks-Scanlon Company
and the Eastern Texas Railroad were not in bankruptcy at the time of
the litigation. Even the New Haven district court acknowledged30 the
long-standing proposition that federal bankruptcy powers are exercised
subject to the Fifth Amendment.40 The Interstate Commerce Act,
which might be thought to have had some impact upon the constitu-
tional rights of the New Haven's bondholders, is similarly subordinate
to the Fifth Amendment. 41
III
The Supreme Court suggested a number of possible grounds for its
refusal to recognize pre-1969 bondholder losses as a compensable taking
of property. Although the Court alluded to possible procedural defects
in the bondholders' presentation, 42 the outcome seems to have turned
35. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. See p. 1005 supra.
37. See, e.g., Jay Street Connecting R.R. v. United States, 174 F. Supp. 609, 615
(E.D.N.Y. 1959), citing Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920); Chli-
cago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897), citing Monongahela Nay. Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
38. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). See generally Kratovll
& Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 597 (1954).
39. In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 454 (D. Conn. 1968),
40. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935); see Wright
v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 457 (1937); Ginsberg v.
Lindel, 107 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1939); In re Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 90 F.2d 312, 314
(7th Cir. 1937).
41. See cases cited in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589
n.19 (1935); New York, N.H. & H. R.R., Bondholders' Comm. v. United States, 289 F.
Supp. 418, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
42. The Court suggested, first, that the bondholders may have failed to make a requi-
site showing of "the depreciation and losses attributable to the prevaluation period."
New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 493 (1970). These, however, were statutory re-
1010
Vol. 82: 1004, 197.3
Takings and the Public Interest in Railroad Reorganization
on two substantive propositions: first, that the bondholders had been
deprived, at most, of remedial rights; and second, that the public inter-
est in continued rail service superseded any property rights claimed by
the bondholders.
The Court implied, to begin with, that the district court's decision
to continue New Haven rail operations did no more than suspend the
bondholders' "remedial" right to foreclose on mortgaged property.43
The district court's unquestioned power to do this, the Court seemed
to conclude, negated any claim that resulting losses were compensable
under the Takings Clause. This perspective apparently derived from
earlier railroad reorganizations that were, in fact, fundamentally differ-
ent from New Haven.
The Court gave particular weight to Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry.,4 4 the Supreme Court's first con-
view proceedings to determine the fairness of the ICCs inclusion plan; the bondholders
were not making a direct claim against the Federal Government for compensation under
the Fifth Amendment. See note 27 supra. At most the Court was asked to rule that the
bondholders had been left with some uncompensated losses that constituted a taking,
and the Court conceded that they had suffered "substantial loss." See p. 1008 supra.
No further proof was needed for the Court to have adjudicated the theoretical taking
question.
Second, the Court suggested that the bondholders waived their rights to some degree
by their long-term acquiescence in the reorganization proceedings: "[T]he failure of the
bondholders to press for early liquidation of the New Haven meant that their initial
application [in April 1967] for a dismissal of the reorganization proceedings came just
as the objective of salvaging the New Haven appeared possible to achieve." New Haven
Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 493 (1970). As an argument, this fails to be convincing.
Not only had the Court already acknowledged the bondholders' liquidation rights. id.
at 489-90, but also, when the April 1967 dismissal petition was filed, the district court
rejected it as premature. In re New York, N.H. & H. R. R., 281 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn.
1968). It is not clear whether the Court was suggesting bad faith on the part of the
bondholders, inasmuch as they cooperated as long as they did, or conditioning the con-
stitutional right upon an early filing for dismissal, which would, as a procedural rule,
result in creditors invariably requesting dismissal on the first day of reorganization.
Neither interpretation is convincing. The district court seems to have reassured the bond-
holders for some time that their constitutional rights would be safeguarded in the
court's ultimate review of any takeover plan, see note 23 supra, thus minimizing what-
ever incentive the bondholders may have had to seek earl), dismissal. Moreover, each
time the trustees petitioned for new financing that would precede the bondholders in
priority in a distribution of rail assets, the court announced its intention to protect the
interests of the New Haven bondholders. See, e.g., In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R..
Memorandum of Decision on Petition for Order No. 81 (Mar. 5, 1962), in 1 NEW HAvv;
PROCEEDINGs 673, 675-77; In re New York, N.H & H. R.R., Memorandum of Decision on
Petition for Order No. 25 (Oct. 20, 1961), in I NEw HAVFv PROCEEDiNGS 285, 289-93. In
addition, the ICC was firmly opposed to any effort to abandon and liquidate the New
Haven, and its approval of an abandonment of rail services would have been necessary
even after dismissal of Section 77 proceedings, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(18), 1(20) (1970). Pennsyl-
vania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 334 I.C.C. 25, 54 (1968). The ICC and the
district court, themselves, encouraged the acquiescence that the Supreme Court seems
to have viewed as a bondholder strategy.
43. The Court said that a lien creditor's claim that injury would result from sus-
pension of his foreclosure rights, "'presents a question addressed not to the power of
the court but to its discretion-a matter not subject to the interference of an appellate
court unless such discretion be improvidently exercised.'" New Haven Inclusion Cases,
399 U.S. 392, 490-91 (1970), quoting Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chi-
cago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 677 (1935).
44. 294 US. 648 (1935).
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stitutional decision under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. In Con-
tinental Bank the Court affirmed an injunction, pending reorganiza-
tion, against the sale of bonds pledged by the railroad as security for
certain collateral notes. The Court concluded that the injunction did
not impair the pledgees' liens or otherwise deliberately cause a depre-
ciation in their security interests. In view of the fact that the bonds
had face amounts totalling three times the notes they secured, 45 the
pledgees' claims were not in jeopardy and the injunction did "no more
than suspend the enforcement of the lien by a sale of collateral pending
further action." 46 Thus, on the facts, the pledgees lost no property cog-
nizable under the Takings Clause. 47
The bankruptcy of the New Haven posed a problem dramatically
different from Continental Bank: the New Haven could only run at a
loss and its creditors were plainly disserved by continued operations."8
Each day the trains ran, as required by the district court's order, the
creditors' losses mounted. In this vital characteristic, the New Haven
case resembled Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford40 rather
than Continental Bank. In Radford the Supreme Court clearly interred
any notion that bankruptcy proceedings may strip creditors of the
right ultimately to receive the value of their collateral. The Frazier-
Lemke Act of 1934, which amended the Bankruptcy Act, had declared
a moratorium on farm mortgage foreclosures. Radford held the statute
constitutionally defective in that it failed, among other things, to pro-
tect the mortgagee from accumulating deferred taxes and from a gen-
eral wasting of the property.50 These terms of the Act,51 the Court held,
directly took the mortgagees' property without just compensation."5
Similarly, the New Haven bondholders' property interest in rail-
45. The banks and the Reconstnction Finance Corporation had claims totalling
$17,784,877, secured by collateral worth $56,111,465. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1935).
46. Id. at 676-77.
47. Id. at 680-81.
48. See p. 1007 supra.
49. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
50. Id. at 591-93.
51. Following the Radford decision, Congress amended the original Frazier-Leinke
Act so as to require mortgagors to pay reasonable rental on the retained property, pay
taxes in order to protect the title, and maintain the property to preserve its value. The
Supreme Court then upheld the new Act under the Fifth Amendment. Wright v. Vinton
Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
52. The province of the Court is limited to deciding whether the Frazier-Lemke
Act as applied has taken from the Bank [the mortgagee] without just compensa-
tion, and given to Radford, rights in specific property which are of substantial
value .... As we must conclude that the Act as applied has done so, we must hold
it void. . . . If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of
individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors,
resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation,
the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the public.
295 U.S. at 601-02.
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road assets was deliberately and necessarily impaired by the require-
ment of continued rail services. But in New Haven the Supreme Court
overlooked the character of resulting private injuries as a determinant
of creditors' constitutional rights. That is, the Court ignored the dis-
tinction-illustrated in Continental Bank and Radford-between credi-
tors' temporary loss of strategic control over their collateral and their
loss of the collateral itself.53
The Supreme Court, however, did not base its decision only on the
theory that "mere remedial rights" were affected by the continued defi-
cit operation. The Court stated firmly that any losses imposed on the
bondholders were warranted by the public's interest in uninterrupted
rail service.54 This facet of the Court's opinion relies on the proposition
that investors in railroads "assume the risk attached to their invest-
ments," 5 including, it seems, the risk of collateral erosion in the event
of bankruptcy reorganization. Such an idea had been previously ex-
pressed as dictum in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver &
R.G.W.R.R.0 0 quoted by the Court in New Haven: "[B]y their entry
into a railroad enterprise, [security holders] assumed the risk that in
any depression or any reorganization the interests of the public would
be considered as well as theirs."57
Certainly railroad investors assume some duties in relation to the
public. The scope of assumed risk imputed to the New Haven's bond-
holders, however, could not have derived from traditional contract
theory. As the Supreme Court once observed:
Apart from statute or express contract people who have put their
money into a railroad are not bound to go on with it at a loss if
there is not reasonable prospect of profitable operation in the
53. The district court, on the other hand, seems to have been awarc of this distinction:
[Wlhile under these circumstances, an invasion or postponement of the creditors'
remedies may justifiably be ordered, the court must remain keenly aware that § 77
limits the powers of the court to take action directly affecting the creditors' sub-
stantive rights.
In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Memorandum of Decision on Petition for Order No.
81 (Mar. 5, 1962), in I NEw HAVEN PROCEEDINcs 673, 676. For this reason, citing In re
Third Ave. Transit Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952), the court disapproved the
Trustees' petition to create certain debt that would have taken priority over the bond-
holders' mortgage liens. At no subsequent point did it repudiate this decision that financ-
ing measures having such an effect would, like the terms of the first Frazier-Lemkc
Act in Radford, impair the bondholders' substantive rights.
54. We do not doubt that the time consumed in the course of the proceedings in
the reorganization court has imposed a substantial loss upon the bondholders. But
in the circumstances presented by this litigation we see no constitutional bar to
that result. The rights of the bondholders are not absolute.
New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 491 (1970).
55. Id. at 492, quoting Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 510 (1968).
56. 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
57. Id. at 536, quoted in New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 492 (1970). The
bondholders advanced no constitutional argument in Denver & Rio Grande. Thus, the
quoted passage of Justice Reed's opinion has no clear constitutional significance.
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future .... No implied contract that they will do so can be elicited
from the mere fact that they have accepted a charter from the
State .... 58
This passage states a basic doctrine of the rights of investors in public
utilities. And nothing in the New Haven's charter can be construed as
an express agreement to sustain deficit operations in bankruptcy.50
Thus, under traditional notions, the bondholders' risk of being subor-
dinated to the public interest was limited in scope to the type of loss
permitted in Continental Bank: a suspension of the right to foreclose
amounting to a temporary loss of control over collateral.00
In this respect, Continental Bank typified pre-New Haven railroad
reorganizations under Section 77, involving essentially profitable rail
carriers.61 In these cases, creditors had no compelling interest in aban-
doning and liquidating their debtor railroads in order to preserve the
value of their collateral. In fact, "The uninterrupted continuation of
the business and preservation of [the railroad's] operating and earning
functions [were] inherently essential to the protection of the security of
the mortgage .... 11.o For this reason, private interests generally coin-
cided with the public's interest in uninterrupted service. And in such
cases, only the investor's discretion as to the timing of disinvestment
was necessarily sacrificed to the public interest.03
58. Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n, 254 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1921) (emphasis
added). See Railroad Comm'n v. Eastern Texas R.R., 264 U.S. 79, 85 (1924); Brooks-
Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n. 251 U.S. 396, 399 (1920).
59. See Certificate of Amendments to the Charter & Acts of Incorporation, New
York, N.H. & H. R.R. (1947). The New Haven has no charter document as such. The
railroad is incorporated in the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut,
and is authorized to do business in the state of New York. The Certificate of Amend.
ments was written in 1947 at the consummation of the New Haven's first reorganization.
60. The Supreme Court spelled out its reason for enjoining the sale of collateral
bonds in Continental Bank:
It is evident that the effect here wrought by the menace of impending sales of the
collateral would seriously embarrass and probably prevent the formulation and con-
summation of a plan of reorganization.
It must be apparent ... that without the maintenance of the status quo for a
reasonable length of time no satisfactory plan could be worked out.
Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648,
678-79 (1935).
61. See, e.g., Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 493,
535-36 (1946); Van Schaick v. McCarthy, 116 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1941); In re Missouri
Pac. R.R., 129 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. Mo. 1955), aff'd, 225 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 959 (1956).
62. In re Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 90 F.2d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 1937). The Supreme Court
made the same point in Continental Bank:
[A railroad's] activities cannot be halted because its continuous, uninterrupted op.
eration is necessary in the public interest; and for the preservation of that interest,
as well as for the protection of the various private interests involved, reorganization
was evidently regarded as the most feasible solution whenever the corporation had
become [insolvent] ....
294 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added).
63. The investor might not be injured, in terms of collateral erosion, by the con-
tinued operation of the debtor railroad and yet still prefer to disinvest. He may wish,
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In New Haven the Supreme Court vastly enlarged the scope of in-
vestors' risk, raising the public interest to the level of a supervening
public right in the assets of the railroad. The public plainly had an
interest in the New Haven's continued operation. The Court did not
explain, however, how the public's interest could be suddenly trans-
muted into a public right that constitutionally prevailed over the bond-
holders' claim on the assets.
In fact, the Court never acknowledged passing from the proposition
that the bondholders' rights were "not absolute" to the conclusion
that the railroad's deficit operation was reasonably necessary and that
the bondholders' loss up to 1969 was permissible to promote a public
interest in continued service.64 Indeed, when stated this way, the
for example, to exploit his debtor's bankruptcy as an event of default (as it alma)s is
under the bond indenture) in order to move from his old securities into currently more
profitable ones. Thus, for him, a compulsory maintenance of the status quo t)pically
entails some opportunity cost. However, it is the character of his loss, not the event
of loss per se, that must be the criterion of taking. See generally note 73 infra.
64. New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 490-91 (1970). This was the explicit
theory behind the district court's decision: the New Haven's property would be "taken"
only in the event of an "unreasonably long delay" in the Penn.Central takeover-de-
fined under the circumstances as a delay beyond the end of 1968. Ins re New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 289 F. Supp. 451, 455, 459 (D. Conn. 1968). In a later decision, the court
explained this approach: "The policy of imposing an interim burden of losses, through
its deficit operation, on a railroad in reorganization is to afford a reasonable opportunity
to the responsible agencies to arrange the continuation of the railroad's operation .
In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 304 F. Supp. 793, 801 (D. Conn. 1969). The source of
this perspective on the problem is identifiable: Section 77(g) of the Bankruptcy Act
empowers the reorganization court to dismiss proceedings, as a preliminary to liquidation.
if it foresees an "undue delay in a reasonably expeditious reorganization of the debtor."
11 U.S.C. § 205(g) (1970). Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court explained,
however, how it transmuted this statutory standard for dismissal into a deterninant of
constitutional takings.
The "reasonable delay" theory in New Haven could not have been the same as that
invoked in Continental Bank, see note 60 supra, since the latter case was as much con-
cerned with protecting creditor interests as with aiding the public. Nor was the "rea-
sonable delay" theory simply a standard of fairness formulated for the benefit of the
Penn-Central. Although the holding of the New Haven cases, to be precise, concerned
only the price the Penn-Central was required to pay for the New Haven, the reasoning
that underlay that holding in fact defined the bondholders' constitutional due, and
probably cut off legal recourse in the Court of Claims for supplemental compensation
from the United States Government. If the Court had declined to rule on the bond-
holders' constitutional argument (thereby holding that the "fair and equitable" question
under Section 77 was severable from the ultimate constitutional rights of one party to
the proceedings), the bondholders would have had a plausible action against the Gov-
ernment on a claim arising out of lawful executive (ICC) action and "([]ounded upon
the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(1) (1970). The New Haven decision precludes any
such action. If the United States were held to be a party to the New Haven litigation,
collateral estoppel certainly would bar any re-litigation of the takings question. See 1B
J. MooRE, FEDERA. PRAcricE 0.441[2] (1965). This seems a likely result, because the
United States was a formal party in several of the cases consolidated at the Supreme
Court. See note 25 supra. Indeed, in view of the drift of federal practice away from
the requirements of mutuality and privity, see J. MooRE, supra, 0.A12"1] at 74 (Supp.
1972), the bondholders would probably be estopped even if the United States were not
deemed a formal party to the inclusion litigation. In any event, the Court of Claims
would almost surely treat the Supreme Court's decision as precedent, refusing to acknowl-
edge an event of taking in the New Haven reorganization.
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Court's conclusion may be seen to fit the fundamental contours of tile
substantive due process concept as described almost thirty years ago
in Nebbia v. New York: 65 "If the laws passed are seen to have a rea-
sonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbi-
trary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satis-
fied."' 66 In fact, the district court expressly relied on due process theory
as the operative constitutional rubric in New Haven. The court had
observed in 1965, for example, that "[N]o construction of due process
will permit this court to require that the creditors of this estate witness
the continuing erosion of their security without the slightest prospect
of relief."0' 7 The court continued, "[I]t has been stated on numerous
occasions that the operation of unprofitable passenger service, how-
ever essential, at the expense of the creditors could only be temporary,
as a matter of due process."0 But the bare assumption that the credi-
tors possessed the relative rights in property guaranteed by due process
left unasked the question whether, in the circumstances, they had some
absolute right under takings theory.
IV
Since New Haven was by traditional analysis a takings situation, the
case's "public rights" theory supplies a rationale-with very uncertain
boundaries-for transferring private property into the public domain.
Whenever a public interest is sufficiently compelling, it seems, the
public may take a first claim on the use of private property. Certainly
the public's interest in the New Haven Railroad was not qualitatively
different from its interest in many other important industries. The per-
65. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
66. Id. at 537. The turbulent history of substantive due process doctrine is familiar
to students of constitutional law. Generally speaking, before 1937 the Supreme Court
seemed quite willing to strike down state or federal legislation that it deemed to be
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The turning-point came in 1937 with West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), when the Court began gradually restricting
judicial upset power under substantive due process doctrine until that power virtually
ceased to exist. See generally V. WooD, DUE PaocEss oF LAw 1932-1949 (1951), McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962
Sup. Car. REv. 34; Sterm, The. Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4
VAND. L. REv. 446 (1951).
It is generally believed that the doctrine of substantive due process has become totally
defunct under the Federal Constitution. For this reason, New Haven is peculiar even
if viewed as a due process decision: while the courts held that bondholder losses after
1968 would have been constitutionally impermissible, the public interest in continued
rail services (the "proper legislative purpose') would have been just as important after
1968-had the Penn-Central takeover been delayed-as it had been until that time.
67. In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., Memorandum of Decision re Petition for Order
No. 287 (Feb. 15, 1965), in 5 Naw HAVEN PROCErDNGS 3109, 3115 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 3116 (emphasis added).
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vasiveness of the public interest was acknowledged in 1877 when in
Munn v. Illinois9 the Supreme Court approved state regulation of
private grain elevators, stating that a business need not operate as a
public utility or monopoly to be "affected with a public interest."
Dissenting from the Munn decision, Justice Field opposed the approval
of the regulation on a public interest rationale. With such a test, he
argued, no boundaries to regulation could be set: "[T]here is hardly
an enterprise or business engaging the attention and labor of any con-
siderable portion of the community in which the public has not an
interest in the sense in which that term is used by the court in its
opinion .. . Justice Field's prophecy was correct. Since Munn, the
difference between private and quasi-public businesses has never been
especially germane to the validity of business regulation under the
Due Process Clause.71
The same inability to draw convincing boundaries around "public
interest" may be expected under the Takings Clause, should the New
Haven rationale be accepted as a general proposition of takings law.
Admittedly, the New Haven decisions dealt only with one relatively
small railroad. But what was good for the New Haven's riders should
be just as good for the patrons of others railroads. Moreover, the rail
industry represents only one element of the nation's vital transporta-
tion network, so that New Haven's theory of supervening public rights
would apply equally to any airline or bus line that may have the mis-
fortune of providing a unique (or simply important) public service.
Any public utility may bear a vital relationship to the public interest
and would thus be susceptible to the New Haven doctrine.
To think that some distinction between public utilities and wholly
private businesses would meaningfully limit New Haven is to nurture
an illusion. The public interest could be equally damaged by Lock-
heed's or Grumman's ceasing to produce aircraft as by the New Haven's
ceasing to haul commuters. Nor is mere size a compelling criterion,
except as it relates to the degree of public concern for an industry. A
community might well be better off without its commuter trains than
without its lone private hospital. In terms of the public interest, there
is nothing unique about the New Haven, all railroads, public utilities,
or big business generally; none of these categories provides a mean-
ingful limit on the scope of New Haven's "public rights" doctrine.
69. 94 US. 113 (1877).
70. Id. at 141.
71. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 US. 502, 536-37 (1934).
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V
If, as it appears, New Haven stood on a broad "public rights" theory,
more than practical line-drawing problems are involved in the Su-
preme Court's failure to delineate the boundaries of its new theory.
On closer examination, the New Haven theory seemingly repudiates
the broader principle underlying the Brooks-Scanlon decision, namely
the constitutional right to retrieve property from unprofitable uses,
or to be compensated for the denial of that right.7 2
If New Haven is read to renounce this principle, the decision has
cut the Takings Clause to the quick; for, as demonstrated in a recent
article by Professor Sax, this "retrieval rule" is the most basic guar-
antee of the Takings Clause.73 Sax approaches the takings problem
from the perspective of maximizing the scope of non-compensable gov-
ernmental regulation-that is, determining the minimum meaningful
sweep of the Takings Clause. He explains that many property uses are
inextricably related to one another, with each property owner enjoying,
at any given point in time, a set of use rights disadvantageous to others.
Activities that thus impose sacrifices on others have "spillover effects,"
and Sax argues that the legitimate scope of state police power (or the
72. The retrieval rule has been vindicated repeatedly in case law. In addition to
Brooks-Scanlon and Eastern Texas, discussed at pp. 1008-10 supra, see United States v.
Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951); Bullock v. Florida ex rel. Railroad Comm'n, 251
U.S. 513 (1921) (dictum); Segarra-Serra v. Scott, 242 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1957), Rivera v.
R. Cobian Chinea & Co., 181 F.2d 974 (Ist Cir. 1950); Pewee Coal Co. v. United States,
161 F. Supp. 952 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 912 (1959); Govt. of the Virgin
Islands v. Massac, 161 F. Supp. 704 (D. Virgin Is. 1958); Wheelock Bros., Inc. v. United
States, 88 F. Supp. 278 (Ct. Cl. 1950), vacated on juris. grounds, 341 U.S. 319 (1951).
73. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Public Rights]. Sax's analysis in this article marks a significant advance
over his own earlier work, Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964),
and more especially over the previous work of other commentators on takings law. See,
e.g., Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221, 226-37(1931); Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Note, Governmental Seizure of a
Business to Prevent Strike-Caused Work Stoppages-Regulation or Taking? 19 GEo. WASh.
L. REv. 184 (1950). Writers, in attempting to differentiate "takings" from "mere regt-
lation," have tested the logic of diverse criteria in search of a general theory of takings.
The source of conceptual problems is not difficult to discern. In a sense, all governmental
restrictions on property use deprive the owner of valuable opportunities to profit from
property to which he has formal title. As restrictions grow, it quickly becomes difficult,
if not impossible from a purely economic standpoint, to distinguish a formal condent-
nation and seizure of property from the regulatory destruction of valuable use rights-
at best the distinction is a quantitative one. Not surprisingly, attempts to develop a
degree of loss, or "diminution of value" test as a theory of takings have given coin.
mentators more exercise than enlightenment. The apparent economic paradox of selective
loss compensation under the Takings Clause led one writer simply to conclude that
the constitutional decision whether to compensate must rely upon ad hoc "social policy"judgments-a criterion of last resort with little to recommend it as a neutral principle.
See Cormack, supra, at 259.
Professor Michelman's landmark work, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation," 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967), is some-
what unique in that his effort is concerned solely with rationalizing just compensation
generally rather than with defining the scope of the Takings Clause.
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federal regulatory powers) includes authority to alter the existing set
of legal relations so as to eliminate or to reverse such effects.7 4
The key to Sax's theory lies in the definition of "spillovers": a spill-
over is a use of or effect on another person's property or some common
resource base that is not itself subject to private ownership. Sax argues
that a reasonable construction of the Constitution allows governmental
regulation of all such spillovers with immunity from the Takings
Clause,75 on the theory that regulation of competing demands on a
"common" or of conflicting uses of private property does not take
away anything that was "owned." But he explicitly cautions that "Only
in such situations may one use be curtailed by the government without
triggering the takings clause."' 6
Among the residual situations to which the Takings Clause is ap-
plicable, requiring compensation, would be the forced continuation
of a property use to preserve the benefits it creates for other people. If
curtailment of a non-spillover use must be a taking, as Sax contends,
then the owner must have a right, absent compensation, to devote his
property to any non-spillover use and to choose among such uses at his
pleasure. This right is effectively impaired by the compulsory continua-
tion of a particular use. Thus, the owner's right to retrieve and re-
deploy his property is implicit in Sax's analysis as an affirmative state-
ment of the right to pursue non-spillover property uses. Sax's deriva-
tion of this principle as the logical boundary of uninhibited government
regulation lends new significance to the Brools-ScanlonT retrieval
rule. The rule emerges from Sax's theory as the core of the narrowest
meaningful interpretation of the Takings Clause.
Sax thus outlines the permissible role of "public rights" vis-4-vis
the Takings Clause78 The public may be considered to have the same
status in asserting its spillover interests (with respect to the common
resource base) as does a traditional owner (with respect to private prop-
erty). And when there is a spillover conflict between the public and a
private owner, the state may, as a referee, choose between them with-
out triggering a constitutional need for compensation. Sax illustrates
74. Public Rights, supra note 73, at 151-62. The most obvious species of spillover is
the "noxious use," or the nuisance prototype. Id. at 161-62. But a spillover could also
result from a non-tortious activity or land use that merely restricts another person's use
of his own property, typified by the erection of a tall building in the glide path of
landing or ascending aircraft. Id. at 162, 164-69. Legislative restrictions upon these types
of spillover suppress costs that the one property owner had previously created and im-
posed upon others or upon the public at large.
75. Public Rights, supra note 73, at 161-62.
76. Id. at 161.
77. 251 U.S. 396 (1920). See pp. 1008-10 supra.
78. See Public Rights, supra note 73, at 155-61.
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this type of case with two prototypes: the familiar airspace cases, in
which aviation progress eroded the antiquated notion that land owner-
ship extended vertically "from hell to heaven";w and certain "eco-
system" problems, as where a coastal landowner proposes to destroy
wetlands that are believed to be essential to biological life-support
systems.8 0 Sax's theory is inherently limited by the natural resource
examples on which he reli'es. In those cases, the benefits enjoyed by
persons other than the landowner were not created by the owner in
the first place. Such cases are palpably different from ones similar to
New Haven in which the private owner creates benefits through his
own investment and effort. Sax nowhere suggests that these different
sorts of cases merit similar constitutional treatment. Since owner-gen-
erated benefits do not fit Sax's definition of spillover, governmental
action in such situations must be subject to the Takings Clause and
trigger rights to compensation.
This reading of Sax identifies the retrieval rule as the primary
operative principle of the Takings Clause, and indeed, the retrieval rule
has been a constitutional theme in case law since the dawning of mod-
em government regulation. In 1877, the Supreme Court upheld state
regulation of grain elevators in Munn v. Illinoissl on the reasoning
that public regulation of business could extend as far as any public
interest created by the operator. The Court stipulated, however, that
the operator "may withdraw his grant [of a public interest] by discon-
tinuing the use."8s2 The Court accepted extensive economic regulation
here, as in later cases,83 largely because the property owner always
retained the right to retrieve his property and to escape regulation as
an ultimate remedy against government interference.
The New Haven decision, by repudiating the retrieval rule, has
79. Id. at 164-66. Sax's theory of "public rights" has been anticipated in practice to
some extent in the aircraft noise cases. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
261 (1946) (dictum); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
80. Public Rights, supra note 73, at 149 nA, 162. State courts, which have been the
primary forum for this specific problem, have typically treated wetlands preservation
as a taking. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971);
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 356 Mass.
635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970). See also Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn.
304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964).
81. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
82. Id. at 126.
83. See, e.g., Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 575 (1911), where the Supreme
Court considered a motion for rehearing on an earlier decision that upheld a statutory
assessment on bank deposits for purposes of creating a depositors' guaranty fund. In
denying the motion, Justice Holmes wrote that "there [was] no out and out uncon.
ditional taking at all. The payment can be avoided by going out of the banking business,
and is required only as a condition for keeping on, from corporations created by the
State." Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
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carelessly upset settled and necessary constitutional doctrine. It has
broken down the last meaningful distinction between governmental
actions affecting property that require compensation under the Con-
stitution and those that do not.
VI
The New Haven decision has as yet made no lasting imprint on
general constitutional doctrine. The decision has been so thoroughly
enveloped in the factual and procedural complications of the New
Haven reorganization that its broader relevance to takings law has not
been widely recognized. This is fortunate. But, the New Haven deci-
sion does provide discernible precedent for further uncompensated tak-
ings in the context of major railroad insolvencies. Here, at least, it
poses a distinct threat to fundamental takings doctrine.
Already Congress has enacted one law, the Rail Passenger Service
Act of 1970,84 part of which would have been fatally defective under
the Takings Clause, were it not for the New Haven decision. This Act
bars any railroad that does not enlist its rail passenger services in the
Amtrak network-on contractual terms that could be extremely unfair
to the railroadsa-from discontinuing those services for any reason be-
fore 1975.8( The Act was dearly designed to persuade passenger rail-
roads to join Amtrak despite contractual inequities.87 Although there is
84. 45 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). The provisions of this Act, its history, and its prospects
for success are discussed in Thorns, Amtrak: Rail Renaissance or Requiem? 49 Cju.-KL-r
L. REv. 29 (1972).
85. See note 87 infra.
86. Unless it has entered into a contract with the Corporation pursuant to section
561(a)(1) of this title, no railroad may discontinue any intercity passenger train
whatsoever prior to January 1, 1975, the provisions of any other Act, the laws or
constitution of any State, or the decision or order of, or the pendency of any pro-
ceeding before, a Federal or State court, agency, or authority to the contrary not-
withstanding. On and after January 1, 1975, passenger train service operated by such
railroad may be discontinued under the provisions of section 13a of Title 49.
45 U.S.C. § 564(a) (1970).
87. This is illustrated in a recent decision in the Penn.Central reorganization. See In re
Penn Central Transp. Co., 329 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The court approved an Am-
trak contract submitted by the Penn-Central's reorganization trustees. This contract
placed part of the Penn-Central's passenger line in Amtrak on terms that, in the final
analysis, perpetuated at least part of the private loss from continued rail service. Id. at
478-79. Indenture trustees for bondholders having a mortgage on the affected line chal-
lenged the contract on constitutional grounds, pointing out that the property would
be worth more in liquidation than as a going concern within Amtrak. The court
eluded this issue:
The statute provides that any railroad which has not entered into a contract with
Amtrak by May 1, 1971 will be precluded from discontinuing any existing inter-city
passenger train until 1975; and there would be no possibility of again considering
entry into Amtrak until 1973. While the validity of these provisions ma) be open to
question, the Trustees are in no position to sustain the huge losses which would be
entailed in the continued operation of these trains while the validity of the statutory
provisions might be litigated.
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no evidence showing that the no-abandonments provision was inspired
by the New Haven decision, that provision could be upheld on the
authority of New Haven if and when it is challenged under the Tak-
ings Clause.
If the courts wish to preserve the Takings Clause as a viable and
meaningful constraint on government action, they must find a way to
interpret the New Haven decision as something less than a general
repudiation of the retrieval rule. It may be possible for the courts to
invoke New Haven's constitutional. theory only in railroad bankrupt-
cies. But while this strategy might work in practice, it would repre-
sent an arbitrary exception to general takings law. A better approach
would be to limit the holding strictly to the facts of the case, perhaps
by identifying some procedural nicety in the New Haven litigation
as a pivot for the Supreme Court's decision. 8s In this way, the decision
would never crystallize as a doctrine in constitutional law. Whatever
means may best serve, the integrity of the Takings Clause requires that
the New Haven decision be strictly isolated.
Id. at 479.
Neither the "no-abandonments" provision of the statute nor the contract with Amtrak
recognized the bondholders' constitutional right of retrieval. Since the contract gave tile
railroad-and ultimately the bondholders-less than liquidation value for its property, tile
bondholders received less than just compensation for their property. Thus, in essence,
the Amtrak legislation gave the railroad two alternatives: to hold out and be forced to
keep operating as a loss, which would be like the New Haven result; or to have its line
nationalized, in effect, at less than just compensation.
88. Several procedural theories were implicit in the Supreme Court's opinion, though
they were not particularly compelling. See note 42 supra.
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